This paper studies opportunistic scheduling schemes to enhance the secrecy performance in multi-user multiple-input single-output (MU-MISO) non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) systems, in which a multiple antenna base station (BS) serves multiple single-antenna cell-center and cell-edge users in the presence of multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. In order to improve the secrecy performance, we propose an opportunistic scheduling scheme, called the proposed antenna/users selection (PAUS) scheme. Additionally, we consider two practical eavesdropping scenarios, namely colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. We derive the exact closed-form expression for secrecy outage probability (SOP) and asymptotic SOP of the PAUS scheme under different eavesdropping scenarios. We provide the 2D golden section search-based algorithm to find the optimal values of the transmit power and power allocation coefficient that minimize the system secrecy outage performance. The developed analyses are verified by Monte Carlo simulations. The numerical results show that the PAUS scheme improves secrecy performances compared to the benchmark random antenna/users selection (RAUS) scheme. To provide further insights into the system secure performance, the effects of transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), power allocation coefficient, the number of transmit antennas at the BS, number of cell-center and cell-edge users, and the eavesdropper placements are extensively evaluated and discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been considered as a key technique to improve the spectral efficiency for the next-generation mobile networks [1] - [4] . Comparing with the orthogonal multiple access (OMA) [5] , NOMA can allocate a resource to multiple users by using the superposition coding [6] , [7] . For example, in a two-user NOMA system, a base station (BS) simultaneously serves two users, one is the cell-center user which has strong channel condition and the other is the cell-edge user which has poor channel condition. At the BS, the signals of the two users are linearly superimposed with different power allocation coefficients.
wiretapping attacks in NOMA systems [11] , [12] . Wyner in [13] introduced the basic concept of the PLS and proved that the perfect secure transmission can be achieved when the channel state information (CSI) of the main channel (between two legitimate users) is higher than that of the eavesdropper channel (between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper) from an information-theoretical perspective [14] . Thus, the PLS has been raised as an interesting research issue in NOMA systems.
Opportunistic scheduling has been utilized as an important approach to improve the secrecy performance in NOMA systems [15] . The opportunistic scheduling can dynamically adapt the transmitter/receiver based on the estimated physical layer channel information; thus, the system performance can be enhanced compared to conventional scheduling schemes, e.g., round robin, first-in first-out, earliest deadline first scheduling. Similar to the work by Viswanath et. al. [16] , the opportunistic scheduling in our system indicates that the BS always selects the best users pair for transmission in an artificially induced fast fading environment. The opportunistic scheduling scheme significantly improves the secrecy performance compared to the conventional selection schemes in cooperative relaying systems [17] . The opportunistic scheduling is employed to select the relay-destination pair to enhance the outage probability when the number of relays/destinations is increased [18] . Furthermore, the research of opportunistic scheduling in NOMA systems will be an important topic that improves the reliability and spectrum utilization.
A. RELATED WORKS AND MOTIVATIONS
In NOMA context, various system models are proposed to improve the secrecy performance. Specifically, the authors in [19] studied the PLS in NOMA systems. As an extension of [19] , the authors in [20] proposed a new NOMA system architecture, where a BS is equipped with multiple transmit antennas generating artificial noise to degrade the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the eavesdroppers. Zhao et al. in [21] studied the PLS in multiuser visible light communication with NOMA, where the secrecy performance is depended on the distance and angle between transmitter and receiver. In [22] , the authors compared the secrecy performance between amplify-and-forward (AF) and decodedand-forward (DF) relaying protocols in cooperative NOMA system and showed that the these protocols achieve the same secrecy performance. The authors in [23] considered the PLS in underlay cognitive NOMA system to evaluate the secrecy performance. The authors in [24] exploited the outage performance on multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) NOMA systems. The authors in [24] proposed transmit antenna selection (TAS) scheme to enhance the secrecy performance at BS. The related works [19] - [24] limited in evaluation of secrecy performance in NOMA systems without considering users scheduling scheme, and thus lessening the secrecy performance of NOMA systems.
In order to improve the secrecy performance, the opportunistic scheduling schemes with multiple antennas were introduced in [25] , [26] . Particularly, the authors in [25] proposed the various TAS scheme in NOMA systems to enhance the secrecy performance. However, the authors in [25] did not consider the users selection and practical eavesdropper scenarios. In multi-source multi-relay networks, Fan et al. in [26] exploited two opportunistic scheduling schemes to provide the flexible choice based on the implementation complexity. In [27] , the authors proposed the TAS scheme to enhance the PLS in MIMO cognitive radio networks, where the receivers are equipped with multiple antennas and use the maximal ratio combining (MRC) and selection combining (SC) techniques to overcome the fading problem. In [28] , the authors proposed the source-relay pair selection scheme to combat the eavesdropper attacks, where the eavesdropper uses MRC and SC techniques to wiretap the source information. The authors in [29] studied the impacts of eavesdropping scenarios, i.e., colluding and non-colluding cases, on the security performance in the systems with a full-duplex receiver. The authors in [30] proposed the user scheduling scheme with TAS to reduce complexity while maintaining the system performance in MIMO NOMA systems without wiretapping attacks. Moreover, this work [30] had some limitations in terms of the system model and technical perspectives.
The aforementioned works [19] - [24] mainly focus on the PLS on NOMA system without opportunistic scheduling or the opportunistic scheduling on conventional relaying systems addressed as [26] - [29] . In order to enhance the spectral efficiency, NOMA systems will play an important technique in the future mobile networks. In practical NOMA systems, the mobile nodes are typically deployed in dense networks and grouped into clusters [9] , [28] , [31] . NOMA systems are vulnerable from the eavesdroppers attacks. Thus, we are motivated the study of the impact of opportunistic scheduling schemes to enhance the secrecy performance and the practical eavesdropping attack scenarios to prevent the message against illegitimate users in NOMA systems.
B. CONTRIBUTION AND ORGANIZATION
In this paper, we exploit a multi-user multiple-input single-output (MU-MISO) NOMA system, where a multiple antennas BS can serve multiple cell-center users and multiple cell-edge users with the existing of multiple eavesdroppers. Then, we propose the opportunistic scheduling scheme, called the proposed antenna/users selection (PAUS) scheme, to enhance the secrecy performance against the practical eavesdroppers such as colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers. Specifically, the PAUS scheme consists of two steps such as the transmit antenna selection and cellcenter/cell-edge users in each cluster selection steps, respectively. In PAUS scheme, the transmit antenna is selected to minimize the eavesdropper channel capacity and the cell-center and cell-edge users in each cluster are selected to maximize the secrecy capacity of its message, respectively, before data transmission process. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We propose the opportunistic scheduling scheme, called the PAUS scheme, that selects the transmit antenna and cell-center/cell-edge users in each cluster to improve the secrecy performance in MU-MISO NOMA systems. More specifically, the proposed scheme consists of the transmit antenna and users selection processes. The transmit antenna selection process selects the transmit antenna to minimize the eavesdropper channel capacity. The users selection process selects the cell-center and cell-edge users to maximize the secrecy capacites of the cell-center and cell-edge users in each cluster, respectively. Additionally, we consider the practical eavesdropping scenarios such as colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers on the proposed selection scheme. The considered NOMA system is a unique model and the proposed scheduling scheme has not been reported in this literature.
• We derive the exact closed-form expression for SOP and asymptotic SOP of the cell-center and the cell-edge users, respectively. The total SOP and the secrecy sum throughput are also provided to give more insight information into the system performance. Moreover, the developed analyses are validated via Monte-Carlo simulations.
• We provide an optimal analysis of transmit SNR and power allocation coefficient, where we carry out the 2D golden section search-based method to find the optimal values of transmit SNR (γ * ) and power allocation coefficient (θ * N j * ) that minimize the total SOPs. The proposed algorithm can find the optimal values before data transmission phase.
• We show through the numerical results that the SOP of the cell-center user reaches its performance floor in high SNR region, and the SOP of the cell-edge user can achieve its minimum value at certain SNRs. Additionally, the proposed scheduling scheme and iterative-based search algorithm effectively support the secrecy performance of the considered NOMA systems.
• We also evaluate and discuss the effects of the related system parameters such as transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), power allocation coefficient, the number of transmit antennas at the BS, number of cell-center and cell-edge users, and the eavesdropper placements on the secrecy performance of the considered cases. Specifically, the case of colluding eavesdropping shows better wiretapping ability than that of non-colluding eavesdropping one.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II, the proposed system model and the opportunistic scheduling scheme are described under the different eavesdropping cases. Section III analyzes the exact closed-form expression for SOP of the considered cases. Section IV analyzes the asymptotic SOP of the considered cases. Section V presents the optimal analysis to find the values such as transmit SNR and power allocation coefficient. Section VI provides some illustrative numerical results by Monte Carlo simulations. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND CHANNEL MODELING
Let us consider a MU-MISO NOMA systems including a BS, denoted by S, a set of cell-center users, N = {N j |j = 1, 2, . . . , N }, a set of cell-edge users, F = {F k |k = 1, 2, . . . , K }, and a set of eavesdroppers, E = {E l |l = 1, 2, . . . , L}, as depicted in Fig. 1 . In this system, the eavesdroppers can overhear the transmission between the legitimate users, i.e., from the BS to the cell-center/cell-edge users. We assume that the BS is equipped with M -antenna and the legitimate users and eavesdroppers are equipped with a single omni-directional antenna, respectively. In order to comprehensively analyze the system performance, we assume that the required channel state information (CSI) is available at each receiver [9] , [20] , [24] , [25] , [32] . 1 Let us consider a channel X → Y, where X ∈ {S} presents the transmit antenna at BS and Y ∈ {N, F, E}.h XY and G XY denote the characteristics of the small-scale fading and large-scale path-loss effects of the channel from the transmitter to the receiver [34] . We assume all wireless links exhibit independent and identical distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh block flat fading. Since the small-scale fading magnitudẽ h XY follows Rayleigh distribution, the corresponding fading gain |h XY | 2 follows the exponential distribution. Additionally, the large-scale path-loss can be expressed as
, where d XY denotes the Euclidean distance between X and Y, d 0 presents the reference distance, L denotes the estimated power degradation at d 0 (dB unit), and presents the path-loss exponent. Thus, we can obtain the channel coefficient considering both the small-scale and large scale fading, i.e., h XY G XYhXY . The cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF) of the |h XY | 2 can be, respectively, presented as
where λ XY denotes the mean of the |h XY | 2 . λ XY can be presented as
λ XY , whereλ XY denotes the mean of |h XY | 2 [34] , [35] . Thus, the received signal at Y can be modeled as
where P denotes the transmit power at the transmitter, x(t) means the transmitted signal from X, and n Y (t) presents the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receiver Y.
B. DATA TRANSMISSION PHASE
We assume that the i-th antenna with i = {1, 2, . . . , M } at the BS is selected to transmit the superposed signal to the cell-center user, N j , and cell-edge user, F k , in a certain time slot. Based on the principle of the NOMA, the superposed signal is presented as [7] , where θ N j and θ F k denote the power allocation coefficients for cell-center and cell-edge users, respectively. In this paper, following the definition of NOMA [9] , we assume that [9] . Moreover, we assume that the expectation of the transmit message is 1, i.e., E[|x N j |] = E[|x F k |] = 1.
1) AT THE CELL-CENTER USER
The received signal at the cell-center user, N j , can be written as
where P presents the transmit power of the BS, and n N j denotes the AWGN at the cell-center user, N j , with zero-mean and variance σ 2 N j . The cell-edge user message is allocated with high transmit power based on the principle of NOMA. Therefore, the cell-center user equips with the SIC technique [8] , [36] to eliminate the cell-edge user message from the received signal [25] . The instantaneous signal-tointerference-noise ratio (SINR) to decode the cell-edge user's message, x F k , at the cell-center user can be expressed as
After the SIC process, the cell-center user can obtain its message, x N j . Thus, the SNR to decode the cell-center user's message at N j is expressed as
2) AT THE CELL-EDGE USER Similar to the cell-center user, the received signal at the cell-edge user, F k , can be written as
where n F k denotes the AWGN at F k with zero-mean and variance σ 2 F k . According to NOMA [7] , [9] , the cell-edge user does not require the SIC process since the power allocation coefficient of the cell-edge user is larger than that of the cell-center user. Thus, the cell-center user's message is regarded as the interference at the cell-edge user [9] , [25] , [37] . The received SINR at the cell-edge user to decode x F k can be expressed as
3) AT THE EAVESDROPPER Meanwhile, the overheard signal at the eavesdroppers can be expressed as
where n E l presents the AWGN at E l with zero-mean and variance σ 2 E l . Without loss of generality, we assume that each user has the same variance of noise, i.e., σ 2
In this paper, we consider the worst eavesdropping case which eavesdroppers assume to have strong detection abilities as in [19] , [20] , [24] . Thus, the eavesdroppers distinguish the cell-center user information and cell-edge user information, respectively, from the wiretapping information using the SIC technique. Additionally, we exploit two practical eavesdropping scenarios such as colluding eavesdroppers and noncolluding eavesdroppers. a) Scenario I (Colluding Eavesdroppers): In this scenario, the eavesdroppers can overhear and combine their observations to improve the wiretapping ability [38] . Thus, the perfect secure transmission in the colluding eavesdroppers is more challenging than that in the non-colluding eavesdroppers. The colluding eavesdroppers' SNR of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message can be respectively expressed as [19] , [24] 
where the superscript ''co'' indicates the colluding eavesdroppers scenario. b) Scenario II (Non-Colluding Eavesdroppers): Different from the colluding scenario, the non-colluding eavesdroppers independently decode the wiretapping message and they do not share their observations [38] . Thus, we assume that, in the non-colluding eavesdroppers' scenario, the eavesdropper channel gain achieves the maximum one among the eavesdropper channel gains. Thus, non-colluding eavesdroppers' SNR of the cell-center user's and cell-edge user's messages are, respectively, expressed as
where the superscript ''nc'' stands for the non-colluding eavesdroppers scenario.
C. OPPORTUNISTIC SCHEDULING SCHEME 1) RANDOM ANTENNA/USER SELECTION SCHEME
We consider the random antenna/users selection (RAUS) scheme as a benchmark scheme for comparison purpose.
In particular, the RAUS scheme randomly selects a transmit antenna at BS and the cell-center/cell-edge users in each cluster for data transmission, respectively.
a: CASE 1: RAUS SCHEME WITH COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
In case 1, the instantaneous SINRs of the main channel of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message are, respectively, described as
where the superscript ''c1'' indicates the case such as RAUS scheme with colluding eavesdroppers. Similar to (14) and (15), the instantaneous SNRs of the eavesdropper channel of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message are mathematically described as
It is noted that the RAUS scheme does not utilize the user channel infromation. Thus, in the case of RAUS scheme, the antenna/user selection processes do not effect on the SINRs of the selected cell-center and cell-edge user channel information different from the proposed selection scheme.
b: CASE 2: RAUS SCHEME WITH NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
Since the difference between case 1 and case 2 is the eavesdropping scenario, the SINRs of the main channels that are cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message in case 2 are mathematically expressed as
where the superscript ''c2'' stands for the case such as RAUS scheme with non-colluding eavesdroppers. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper channel SNRs of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message can be, respectively, expressed as
Similar to case 1, since case 2 does not require the channel information for the transmit antenna and users selections, the transmit antenna and users are randomly selected in case 2.
2) PROPOSED ANTENNA/USERS SELECTION SCHEME
The proposed scheme, called the proposed antenna/users selection (PAUS) scheme, consists of three steps which can be presented by following steps:
• Step 1: The users (including eavesdroppers) feedback each channel information to BS. The BS utilizes the received channel information for the TAS and users selection processes, respectively.
• Step 2: The BS selects the transmit antenna to minimize the eavesdropper channel capacity which is mathematically expressed as
where EC ∈ {nc, co} presents the scenario of eavesdropping.
• Step 3: After TAS process (step 2), the BS selects the pair of legitimate users based on the users selection process which is mathematically described as
a: CASE 3: PAUS SCHEME WITH COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
Since the wireless channel is independent, the SINRs of the selected cell-center and cell-edge users in case 3 can be further expressed as
Similar to the SNRs of eavesdropper channel in case 1, the eavesdropper channel SNRs of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message can be expressed as
In case 4, the instantaneous SINRs of the main channel of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message can be expressed as
Similar to the eavesdropper channel in case 2, the SNRs of eavesdropper channel of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message can be expressed as
III. ANALYSIS OF SECRECY OUTAGE PERFORMANCE
In this section, we analyze the effect of each opportunistic scheduling scheme with different eavesdroppers scenarios on the secrecy outage performance of the considered system setup. To estimate the secrecy performance of the considered NOMA systems, we evaluate the SOP of cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message that are, respectively, defined as
where case ∈ {c1, c2, c3, c4}. R case,x N j * th and R case,F k * th (bps/Hz) mean the secrecy target data rate of the cell-center user's and cell-edge user's message, respectively. For the sake of convenience notations, γ P/σ 2 ,
Additionally, since the wireless channel follows the i.i.d. Rayleigh fading, the average channel gains assume that λ ij = · · · = λ SN , λ ik = · · · = λ SF , and λ il = · · · = λ SE , respectively.
A. CASE 1: RAUS SCHEME WITH COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS The next following Lemma presents that the CDF and PDF of colluding eavesdropper channel helps to calculate the exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * and F k * in case 1 and case 3.
the CDF and PDF of T i can be, respectively, written as
where γ (α, β) denotes the lower incomplete Gamma function and (·) means the Gamma distribution [39] .
Proof: See [40] , [41] .
The exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * in case 1 can be derived as
where γ (14) , and (17), the SOP at N j * can be further expressed as
By plugging (36) in (38) , and relying on [42, 3.310 ] and [42, 3.351 .3], The exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * in case 1 can be expressed as (37) . The proof of Theorem 1 is concluded.
The exact closed-form expression for SOP at F k * in case 1 can be derived as
where the adopted notations are followed as
Proof: (34) can be further written as
As can be seen, the events of the probability in (40) are not mutually exclusive because they include the common components,
can be written as
can be further written in (42) , as shown at the bottom of next page. In order to further obtain (42) , we rely on the [42, 3.351.3] and [43, 25.4.38] . After some mathematical manipulations, the exact closed-form expression for SOP at F k * in case 1 can be obtained as in (39) . The proof of Theorem 2 is concluded.
B. CASE 2: RAUS SCHEME WITH NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
The next following Lemma presents that the CDF and PDF of non-colluding eavesdropper channel helps to calculate the exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * and F k * in case 2 and case 4.
Lemma 2: Suppose that W i max 1≤l≤L Z il ; the CDF and PDF of W i can be, respectively, written as
Proof: The CDF of W i is mathematically expressed as
Since the CDF of Z il follows the exponential distribution, (45) can be further expressed as
Relying on the binomial theorem, the CDF of W i can be obtained as (43) . After some algebraic manipulations, the PDF of W i can be obtained as (44) . The proof of Lemma 2 is concluded.
In case 2, the exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * can be derived as
Proof: From (34), the SOP at N j * can be expressed as
We rely on [42, 3.310 ] and [42, 3.351 .3] to further express (48) . After some manipulations, P c2,x N j * out can be obtained as (47) . The proof of Theorem 3 is concluded.
2) THE EXACT CLOSED-FORM EXPRESSION FOR SOP AT F k *
Theorem 4: The exact closed-form expression for SOP at F k * in case 2 can be given by
where x r is defined as (39) and the following notations are adopted as
Proof: Similar to Theorem 2, relying on [42, 3.310 ] and [42, 3.351.3] , the exact closed-form expression for SOP at F k * in case 2 can be easily obtained as (49) . The proof of Theorem 4 is concluded.
C. CASE 3: PAUS SCHEME WITH COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
The best antenna selection criterion with colluding eavesdroppers can be simplified as
The following Lemma that presents the probability of a certain transmit antenna in each time slot at the selected antenna will facilitate the derivation of SOP at N j * and F k * in case 3.
Lemma 3: Pr(i * = i) can be written as
where the following notation is adopted
Proof: Suppose 3A Pr(i * = i); using the total probability theory [44] , 3A can be written as
As can be observed, the events of probability in (53) are not mutually exclusive since each event includes the common component T i . Thus, by conditioning on T i = t, 3A can be further expressed as
Utilizing (35), (36) , and the definition of lower incomplete Gamma function [42, 8.352 .6], 3A can be further expressed as
After similar mathematical steps of [45] , (55) can be further expressed as
and M 0 is defined as (52) . Relying on [42, eq. 3.351.3], we can easily obtain in (52) . The proof of Lemma 3 is concluded.
Lemma 4: The CDF and PDF of T i * can be, respectively, expressed as
(57)
and J 0 are defined as in (52) . Proof: The CDF of T i * can be written as
By plugging (35) into (59) and after similar mathematical steps of (55), the CDF and PDF of T i * can be obtained as (57) and (58), respectively. The proof of Lemma 4 is concluded. 2) THE EXACT CLOSED-FORM EXPRESSION OF SOP AT F k * Theorem 6: The exact closed-form expression for SOP at F k * in case 3 can be derived in (61), as shown at the bottom of next page, where x r is defined as (39) and the following notations are adopted as
Proof: See Appendix B.
D. CASE 4: PAUS SCHEME WITH NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
The best antenna selection criterion with non-colluding eavesdroppers can be simplified as
The following lemma that presents the probability of a certain transmit antenna in each time slot at the selected antenna will facilitate the derivation of the exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * and F k * in case 4.
Lemma 5: Pr(i * = i) with non-colluding eavesdroppers can be written as
Proof: Suppose 4A Pr(i * = i); using the total probability theory [44] , 4A can be written as
As can be observed, the events of probability in (64) are not mutually exclusive because each event includes the common components W i . Therefore, by conditioning on W i = w, 4A can be rewritten as
By plugging (43) and (44) 
where the following notations are, respectively, adopted as
Proof: The CDF of W i * can be written as
Utilizing (44) and binomial theorem [42, 1.111], we can easily obtain the CDF of W i * as (66). After algebraic steps, we also obtain the PDF of W i * as (67). The proof of Lemma 6 is concluded.
1) THE EXACT CLOSED-FORM EXPRESSION OF SOP AT N j *
Theorem 7: The exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * in case 4 can be derived as
Proof: See Appendix C.
2) THE EXACT CLOSED-FORM EXPRESSION OF SOP AT F k *
Theorem 8: The exact closed-form expression for SOP at F k * in case 4 can be derived as in (70), as shown at the bottom of next page, where the x r is defined as in (39) and the following notations are adopted as
Proof: See Appendix D.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider the asymptotic SOP with both cases in order to insights at high SNR regime. In order to obtain the asymptotic SOP, we rely on the Taylor's series approximation of exp(−a/x) ≈ 1 − a/x when the x → ∞ [46] , [47] .
A. CASE 1: RAUS SCHEME WITH COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS 1) THE ASYMPTOTIC SOP AT N j * Utilizing the fact that exp(−a/x) ≈ 1 − a/x, from (37), the asymptotic SOP at N j * in case 1 can be obtained as
Similar to the case of N j * in case 1, the asymptotic SOP at
B. CASE 2: RAUS SCHEME WITH NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS 1) THE ASYMPTOTIC SOP AT N j * In order to obtain the asymptotic SOP at N j * in case 2, relying on the Taylor's series approximation, the asymptotic SOP at N j * in case 2, P c2,x N j * ∞ , can be calculated as
2) THE ASYMPTOTIC SOP AT F k * Relying on the Taylor's series approximation, the asymptotic SOP at F k * in case 2, P c2,x F k * ∞ , can be obtained as 
2) THE ASYMPTOTIC SOP AT F k * With the help of Taylor's series approximation, the asymptotic SOP at F k * in case 3, P c3,x F k * ∞ , can be calculated as
D. CASE 4: PAUS SCHEME WITH NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS 1) THE ASYMPTOTIC SOP AT N j * Similar to the other cases, relying on the Taylor's series approximation, the asymptotic SOP at N j * in case 4 can be obtained as
2) THE ASYMPTOTIC SOP AT F k * By substituting Taylor's series approximation in (70), the asymptotic SOP at F k * can be obtained as
V. OPTIMAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSMIT SNR AND POWER ALLOCATION COEFFICIENT
In this section, we carry out the iterative search algorithm for the optimal analyses of the transmit SNR (γ ) and power allocation coefficient (θ N j * ). More specifically, 2D GSS algorithm [48] repeatedly updates the search section to find the optimal values of (γ * , θ * N j * ) that minimize the secrecy outage performance, which is outlined as Algorithm 1.
In our paper, the optimization problem concerns to find the optimal points which results in a minimum value of overall secrecy outage performance, P case,total out (γ , θ N j * ), that is explained in detail in the next section. Our algorithm, which is based on the 2D GSS method, can be explained as follows: ; and the given optimization parameters such as interval parameters (d γ and d θ N ), stopping thresholds ( γ , θ ) Output: (γ * , θ * N j * ) Initialization: Determine the interval of uncertainty are [γ a , γ b ] and [θ N j * ,a , θ N j * ,b ], respectively, and the intermediate points γ 1 , γ 2 , θ N j * ,1 , and θ N j * ,2
if P case,total out (γ 1 , θ N j * ,1 ) is the minimal of the considering four points then 3: Update the searching section 4: else if P case,total out (γ 1 , θ N j * ,2 ) is the minimal of the considering four points then 5: Update the searching section 6: else if P case,total out (γ 2 , θ N j * ,1 ) is the minimal of the considering four points then 7: Update the searching section 8: (γ 1 , θ N j * ,1 ) is the lowest value among four points that means the sections between [γ 2 , γ b ] and [θ N j * ,2 , θ N j * ,b ] include the optimal points, then new γ a , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ b , θ N j * ,a , θ N j * ,1 , θ N j * ,2 , and θ N j * ,b are updated as
-If P case,total out (γ 1 , θ N j * ,2 ) is the lowest value among four points that means the sections between [γ 2 , γ b ] and [θ N j * ,a , θ N j * ,1 ] include the optimal points, then new γ a , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ b , θ N j * ,a , θ N j * ,1 , θ N j * ,2 , and θ N j * ,b are updated as
-If P case,total out (γ 2 , θ N j * ,1 ) is the lowest value among four points that means the sections between [γ a , γ 1 ] and [θ N j * ,2 , θ N j * ,b ] include the optimal points, then new γ a , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ b , θ N j * ,a , θ N j * ,1 , θ N j * ,2 , and θ N j * ,b are updated as
-If P case,total out (γ 2 , θ N j * ,2 ) is the lowest value among four points that means the sections between [γ a , γ 1 ] and [θ N j * ,a , θ N j * ,1 ] include the optimal points, then new γ a , γ 1 , γ 2 , γ b , θ N j * ,a , θ N j * ,1 , θ N j * ,2 , and θ N j * ,b are updated as ) and stop iterating, else come back to step 2. It is noted that the 2D GSS algorithm is one of the efficient strategies since this algorithm updates intermediate points based on the golden ratio. More specifically, the number of iterations in 2D GSS is smaller than that of other algorithms [48] . The 2D GSS algorithm only requires one new calculation when the intermediate points is updated. Thus, 2D GSS is one of suitable algorithms to find the optimal points before data transmission.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, representative numerical results are provided to illustrate the secrecy performance of the proposed scheme in terms of SOP and secrecy sum throughput. Insightful discussions relating to the impacts of the transmit SNR (γ ), the power allocation coefficient (θ N j * ), the number of transmit antennas at the BS, the number of cell-center and cell-edge users, and the eavesdropper placements on the system SOP and secrecy sum throughput will be presented.
In simulation settings, we assume that positions of the source (S) with multiple antenna, the cluster of cell-center users, the set of the cell-edge users, and a cluster of the eavesdropper are randomly deployed under satisfying some given constraints. Specifically, we set the distance between the BS and the cluster cell-center users is 10 m, i.e., d SN = 10 m, the distance between the BS and the cluster of cell-edge users is 15 m, i.e., d SF = 15 m, and the distance between the BS and the cluster of eavesdroppers is 30 m, i.e., d SE = 30 m. More specifically, in our simulation, on one hand, the nodes (i.e., a set of the cell-center users/celledge users/eavesdroppers) are assumed to be located at the same place, respectively. It means that these nodes have the same channel characteristics in terms of large-scale fading. Furthermore, channels related to the nodes are modeled as random variables which results in different corresponding small-scale fading. It is noteworthy that this assumption for the simulation has been widely adopted in the literature [9] , [17] , [26] , [28] , [40] . Additionally, the fixed power allocation mechanism has been widely used since it does not increase the complexity of the performance analysis while still reflects the principle as well as the performance efficiency of NOMA systems [49] . Moreover, a dynamic power allocation mechanism is indeed out of the scope of this paper since this paper aims to investigate the impact of the opportunistic scheduling scheme on NOMA systems. Thus, in this paper, we employ the fixed power allocation coefficients, i.e., θ F k * = 0.8, θ N j * = 1 − θ F k * = 0.2, which was widely set in relevant works [9] , [37] , [50] . Additionally, the reference distance is d 0 = 1 m, the power degradation is L = 30 dB at d 0 , and the path-loss exponent is = 2.7.
First, we exploit the impact of the number of legitimate users parameters, e.g., the number of transmit antennas, cell-center users, and cell-edge users, on the secrecy performance. Fig. 2 presents the effect of the number of transmit antennas on the secrecy outage performance. As can be seen, the secrecy performance of the benchmark scheme, called RAUS scheme, is not enhanced when the number of transmit antenna is increased. The reason is that the proposed scheme, named PAUS scheme, selects the transmit antenna to minimize the eavesdropper channel capacity. Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage performance as a function of the number of cell-center users. As can be observed, the number of cell-center users in case 1 and case 2 does not affect the secrecy performance. One of the possible reasons is that the benchmark scheme does not address the channel information to select the received cell-center user. Different from the benchmark scheme, the proposed scheme considers both the main and eavesdropper channel capacities of cell-center user to select the cell-center user. Thus, the proposed scheme dramatically enhances the secrecy performance of the selected cell-center user.
We present the impact of the number of cell-edge users on the secrecy outage performance. As shown in Fig. 4 , different from the benchmark scheme, the proposed scheme enhances secrecy performance. However, compared to that of the selected cell-center user case, the case of the selected cell-edge user does not much enhance the secrecy performance. One of the possible reasons is that, according to NOMA system, the cell-edge user does not eliminate the cell-center user part since the base station allocates its transmit power to the cell-center user less than the cell-edge user. Fig. 2 to Fig. 4 , different from the RAUS scheme, the secrecy outage performance of PAUS scheme is enhanced when the number of transmit antennas/cell-center users/celledge users is increased because the PAUS scheme considers the channel information to select the transmit antenna and cell-center/cell-edge users.
We study the impact of the transmit SNR, γ , on the SOP of the considered scenarios. As can be observed in Fig. 5 , in the case of cell-center user, the SOP of both scenarios reaches its floors when the γ is larger than 15 dB. This phenomenon can be explained as that the cell-center user does not effect on the CSI of the main and eavesdropper channel at high transmit SNR regime. Different from the cell-center user case, the SOPs in the case of cell-edge user show the convex pattern. The reason is that cell-edge user does not equip with SIC function leading to the increase of interference of cell-center user message when the transmit SNR increases as in (8) . The SOP at cell-edge user seems to be saturated at transmit SNR values of which are greater than 20 dB. Additionally, the case of PAUS scheme shows better secrecy performance than that of RAUS scheme. The reason is that the PAUS scheme utilizes the channel information to select the transmit antenna at the BS and users selection in each cluster. Thus, we can conclude that the proposed scheme, called as PAUS scheme, efficiently supports the secrecy data transmission.
We now turn to our attention from the secrecy performance of each user to that of overall secrecy performance. To evaluate the system secrecy performance of the considered cases, we provide the total SOP which is mathematically defined as [10] , [19] , [37] , [51] P case,total
where the superscript ''case'' is defined as (33) and (34) . Fig. 6 presents the total SOP as a function of transmit SNR. As can be seen in Fig. 6 , the pattern of the total SOP seems to be a convex pattern when the transmit SNR increases. This phenomenon can be explained that, though the pattern of SOP at N j * does not seem to be convex, the pattern of SOP at F k * presents the convex when the transmit SNR increases. Thus, similar to the case of cell-edge user, the total SOP seems to be saturated at the value of which is greater than 20 dB. Thus, the appropriately selecting transmit SNR plays an important role in the system planning to optimize the overall system performance. Again, the total secrecy performance of PAUS scheme shows better performance than that of RAUS scheme. From Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , the PAUS scheme improves the system secrecy performance as well as each user' secrecy performance.
The effect of the power allocation coefficient, denoted as θ N j * , on the system secrecy performance is presented in Fig. 7 . It is noted that θ F k * = 1 − θ N j * because of the principle of NOMA system as in [9] , [19] , [52] . As can be observed in Fig. 7 , the pattern of total SOP seems to be a convex pattern when the power allocation coefficient increases. The reason is that the power allocation coefficient also effects on the Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , the effect of the power allocation coefficient does not much impact the transmit SNR. Consequently, from Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 , we can conclude that the appropriately selecting transmit SNR and power allocation coefficient minimizes the total SOP. However, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 have a limitation in revealing the impact of the selected transmit SNR and power allocation coefficient simultaneously. Thus, we provide the next figure to discuss the results of the 2D GSS algorithm to minimize the overall secrecy performance. Additionally, from Fig. 5 to Fig. 7 , our theoretical analyses are in excellent agreement with the simulation ones validating the correctness of our derivation approaches.
We investigate the total SOP as a function of transmit SNR and power allocation coefficient in Fig. 8 . As can be observed, the total SOP of case 4 illustrates a convex function with respect to transmit SNR and power allocation coefficient, respectively. Hence, we can find the optimal values (γ * , θ * N j * ) to minimize the total SOP using the 2D GSS algorithm that is introduced in Section V. We will adopt 2D GSS algorithm with minimum intervals such as γ = 10 −4 and θ = 10 −4 , respectively, the optimal values of γ * (dB) and θ * N j * can be obtained as γ * = 17.4681 and θ * N j * = 0.0126. This approach naturally applies to other cases such as case 1, case 2, and case 3. Fig. 9 presents the total SOP as a function of the eavesdropper distance. As can be seen, the total SOP is reduced when the eavesdropper distance is increased. The reason is that when the eavesdropper distance increases, the eavesdropper is difficult to wiretap the information between BS and cell-center and cell-edge users in each cluster, respectively. Additionally, the secrecy performance gap between colluding and non-colluding scenarios is increased when the number of eavesdropper eavesdroppers is increased. The reason is that the eavesdropping ability of colluding significantly improves since the colluding can share the wiretapped information between eavesdroppers. From Fig. 5 to Fig. 9 , since the proposed scheme consider channel information to select the transmit antenna and users, the PAUS scheme shows better secrecy outage performance than RAUS scheme in terms of various system settings. Additionally, in the same scheduling scheme such as case 1 and case 2 (or case 3 and case 4), the secrecy performance of non-colluding eavesdropping presents better than that of colluding eavesdropping. The reason is that the non-colluding eavesdroppers do not share the overhearing information to improve the eavesdropping performance.
We now turn to our attention to secrecy spectral efficiency. In order to evaluate the secrecy spectral efficiency, we provide the secrecy sum throughput (SST) which is mathematically defined as [49] , [53] 
where case ∈ {c1, c2, c3, c4} presents the considered cases. Fig. 10 exploits the impact of the transmit SNR on the SST. As can be observed, the SST can achieve its maximum value at moderate value of transmit SNRs, i.e., −10 dB to 20 dB, and the SST shows the concave function. However, when the transmit SNR is higher than 20 dB, the SST seems to reach its floor. One of possible reasons is that the secrecy outage performance of cell-center and cell-edge user' message does not much change when the transmit SNR is greater than 20 dB. Consequently, the SSTs do not much effect when the transmit SNR is greater than 20 dB. Additionally, the case of non-colluding with different opportunistic scheduling shows better spectral efficiency than that of colluding. The reason is that the non-colluding scenario does not collect the wiretapping information. The proposed scheduling scheme, called PAUS scheme, improves the secrecy spectral efficiency comparing to RAUS scheme on the same system settings. Fig. 11 plots the SST as a function of power allocation coefficient, denoted as θ N j * . As we can see in Fig. 11 , if the power allocation coefficient is greater than 0.05, SST gradually decreases. Otherwise, SST sharply increases. This phenomenon can be explained that the lower power allocation coefficient dramatically effects on the SST comparing to that of higher value. Again, similar to Fig. 10 , the non-colluding and/or PAUS scheme shows better spectral efficiency than colluding and/or RAUS scheme. Fig. 12 presents the impact of the eavesdropper distance on the SST. As can be observed, the SST of both cases increases when the eavesdropper distance increases. One of possible reasons is that the eavesdropper is difficult to interception of the legitimate users transmission when the distance between base station and eavesdropper is increased. Additionally, the proposed scheme, e.g., case 3 and case 4, shows better secrecy spectral efficiency than that of the benchmark scheme, e.g., case 1 and case 2, because the proposed scheme selects the transmit antenna and the legitimate users to enhance the PLS against multiple eavesdroppers. The non-colluding scenario is better secrecy spectral efficiency than that of colluding scenario because the non-colluding eavesdropper does not share the wiretapped information. From Fig. 10 to Fig. 12 , we investigate the impact of transmit SNR, power allocation coefficient, and eavesdropper distance in terms of SST. As a result, the PAUS scheme shows better secrecy spectral efficiency than RAUS scheme. And, the non-colluding eavesdroppers show lower eavesdropping ability compared to colluding eavesdroppers because the non-colluding does not combine the overhearing information.
Finally, we exploit the complexity order of each case, as shown in Table 1 . Complexity order can be defined as the number of required channel information to select the transmit antenna/users and transmit information [35] , [54] , [55] . As can be observed in Table 1 , the amount of channel information of RAUS scheme (case 1 and case 2) is less than that of PAUS scheme (case 3 and case 4). Different from the RAUS scheme that does not require channel information to select the antenna at BS and users selection in a certain time block, the PAUS scheme utilizes the channel to select the antenna and users in each cluster to enhance the secrecy performance. However, as can be seen in Table 1 , the different eavesdropping on the same scheduling scheme, i.e., case 1 and case 2 (or case 3 and case 4), does not effect on the complexity order. From numerical results, each case has a specific advantage and drawback. Thus, in the viewpoint of system planning, each case can be cleverly applied in practice to achieve a good trade-off between secrecy performance and complexity order.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed the opportunistic scheduling scheme that consists of the transmit antenna selection and users selection in each cluster, called the PAUS scheme, to improve the secrecy performance for MU-MISO NOMA systems. More specifically, the transmit antenna was selected to minimize the eavesdropper channel capacity and the cell-center/cell-edge users were selected to maximize the secrecy capacity of cell-center/cell-edge users messages, respectively. Additionally, we investigated the impact of the eavesdropping scenarios such as colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers on the considered opportunistic scheduling schemes. We derived the exact closed-form expression for SOP with considered opportunistic scheduling scheme and eavesdroppers scenarios. In order to provide more insight into the considered cases, we derived asymptotic SOP and complexity order. Additionally, we carried out the 2D GSS algorithm that finds the optimal values, i.e., transmit SNR and power allocation coefficient, to minimize the total SOP. From the numerical results, the secrecy performance of PAUS scheme outperformed compared to that of RAUS scheme under the same system settings. The case of non-colluding eavesdropping showed better secrecy performance than that of colluding ones. However, through the complexity order analyses, PAUS scheme showed the more required channel information to select the transmit antenna/users in each cluster than that of RAUS scheme.
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From ( 
Relying on [42, 3.351 .3], P c3,x N j * out can be obtained as (60).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 6
From (34), P c3,x F k * out be further expressed as
The events of the probability in (85) are not mutually exclusive because they include the same components T i * ; therefore,
conditioning on T i * = t, and utilizing the transmit antenna selection and user selection processes, and (52) and (64), P c3,x F k * out can be obtained in (86), as shown at the bottom of the previous page. Since the Y ik is non-negative random variable, (86) can be written in (87), as shown at the bottom of the previous page, where β 3 is defined as (61). Utilizing on [43, 25.4.38] and [42, 3.351 .2] and after some algebraic steps, P c3,x F k * out can be obtained as (61).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 7
From (33), P c4,x N j * out can be further written as As can be observed, since the events of probability in (88) include same components W i * , they are not mutually exclusive. Thus, we condition on W i * = w and utilize the transmit and user selection processes. P c4,x N j * out can be expressed as Utilizing [42, 3.310] , to this end, the exact closed-form expression for SOP at N j * in case 4 can be obtained as (69).
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 8
From (34), P c4,x F k * out can be further expressed as
As can be seen, the events of probability in (91) are not mutually exclusive since they include the same components W i * . By conditioning W i * = w, P c4,x F k * out can be expressed as
Relying on the transmit antenna and user selection, (92) can be further written in (93), as shown at the top of this page. Since the random variable, W i * , is non-negative random variable, P c4,x F k * out can be further expressed in (94), as shown at the top of this page. In order to further obtain (94), we rely on [42, 1.111], [42, 3.351.2] , and [43, 25.4.38] . Consequently, the exact closed-form expression for SOP at F k * in case 4 can be obtain as (70).
